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 orders office supplies, and does any-
 thing else Dick and Natalie or you or I
 ask of her.
 If you visit the MORS office, you are
 liable to see one other person. Jack
 Walker, while not a full-time member
 of the MORS office staff, is the editor
 of the PHALANX. He spends several
 days each quarter in the office putting
 the PHALANX together and working
 with Dick, Natalie, and Cynthia. I think
 he is more a fixture of MORS than the
 furniture.
 Well, there they are - the people
 who really bring the visible products
 and services of MORS to you. They are
 nice, personable people - each invalu-
 able and as a group irreplaceable. If you
 ever need their assistance, they are only
 a phone call (703 751-7290) away. Next
 time you see them at a symposium, tell
 them thank-you. H
 ORSA/MAS PANEL REPORT
 Good Military Analysis: What
 Is It; How To Recognize It;
 How To Do It
 Panel Members: Mr. Clayton Tho-
 mas, Air Force Studies and Analyses;
 Dr. Tom Moriarty, United Tech-
 nologies; Mr. Dave Spencer, Hughes
 Aircraft, Prof. Wayne Hughes; Naval
 Postgraduate School; LtCol Jim Bex-
 field, Air Force Studies and Analyses
 (Chair)
 The session examined military anal-
 ysis from four different perspectives as
 each panelist addressed what is good
 analysis, how it should be done, how to
 recognize it, how to improve it, etc.
 The perspectives were Military, Head-
 quarters (Bexfield and Thomas), In-
 dustry, Washington (Moriarty; Industry,
 Field (Spencer); and Military, Field
 Commanders (Hughes). The audience
 included about forty Air Force Academy
 Cadets. Highlights of the panelists'
 views appear below.
 Military, Headquarters
 The first briefing (Bexfield and Tho-
 mas) quoted GEN Larry Welch's re-
 minder that the real purpose of op-
 erations research is "helping decision
 makers make good decisions," and
 observed that the more significant de-
 cisions impacted by AF/SA analyses
 deal with the acquisition of Air Force
 weapon systems important to force
 structure. To help the decision maker,
 analysis must address what he already
 knows and what more he needs to
 know. It must be "scrupulously un-
 biased" and based on "genuine under-
 standing of the issue." Much analysis at
 military headquarters in Washington de-
 pends on the "traditional" approach of
 exercising a "standing model" with in-
 puts selected from "standard data bases"
 to simulate combat outcomes in scenar-
 ios carefully chosen (hopefully) to illu-
 minate the military utility of alternative
 systems or forces. The briefing observed
 that it is often less tedious and more
 timely to use a "top down" approach
 that starts with the particular decision(s)
 to be made and does just enough com-
 putation to identify the preferred alterna-
 tive. Whatever the approach, there are
 questions that a study reviewer will
 naturally ask in assessing the quality of
 a study. The briefing presented sample
 questions of this kind in the form of
 four checklists dealing, respectively,
 with the substance of the study and the
 decision(s) it addresses, the suitability
 of the model(s) used, the suitability of
 the data used, and the manner in which
 the study was accomplished. The brief-
 ing concluded by quoting GEN Welch's
 final test of a useful analysis: "Did it
 contribute to a better decision?"
 Industry, Washington
 Dr. Moriarty agreed with the above
 points, and noted that it is especially
 important for good military analysis by
 industry to be targeted to the decision
 makers in the Washington environment.
 These analyses should be based on
 understanding and anticipation of cus-
 tomer needs in order to help focus
 marketing efforts and allocate resources
 for research. Industrial analyses should
 usefully augment and complement the
 customers' analyses as well as provide a
 test bed for design options. A major
 function of the industry analysts in
 Washington should be to integrate the
 analytical efforts of others at various
 levels to provide a coherent hierarchy of
 results that span the space from force
 structure decisions through engineering
 design options.
 Military, Field
 Wayne Hughes said that if analysis
 in service headquarters is to "help some-
 body decide something better," then
 analysis for field commanders is to
 "help somebody do something better."
 His thesis was that analysis in the op-
 erating forces "is easiest and has the
 biggest payoff." It is easiest (though
 still not easy) because the opposing
 weapon systems (and to some extent the
 tactics) are relatively fixed in the short
 run, as contrasted with the wide range
 of alternatives to be considered in stud-
 ies of future forces. It is very satisfying
 to solve problems where the answers
 have immediate payoff. Recalling the
 World War II guideline for analysts to
 concentrate on projects where one could
 improve effectiveness by at least a
 "hemibel" (a factor of three plus), he
 said that is still good advice for analysts
 in the field. Similarly he deplored too
 much concern with precise optimization.
 He endorsed a top down approach and
 recalled a (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) rule that ap-
 proximately equal fractions of study
 time go to planning to start, doing the
 work, and then correcting the mistakes.
 Observing that 90-95% of analytical re-
 sources "go to Washington" for studies
 of procurement or force levels, he rec-
 ommended shifting 10% to the field,
 and concluded that "the field is where it
 started, where it works best, and where
 more will pay most."
 Industry, Field
 Dave Spencer also concurred with
 the major points of the previous speak-
 ers. He noted that military analysis us-
 ing the methods of operations research
 is variously termed operations analysis,
 mission analysis, and systems analysis,
 although the latter term is better suited
 to engineering/scientific studies. He
 stressed the basic objective of mission
 analysis to provide insight and perspec-
 tive to management regarding trends in
 the relative operational utility of current
 and proposed military systems. This in-
 sight aids management decision makers
 regarding the preferred allocation of
 available resources. Spencer noted the
 contribution of analysis to a particular
 program depends on where the program
 is in the acquisition chain - concept
 definition, concept validation, full scale
 development or production - starting
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 out as aid to basic design, including
 broad functional requirement tradeoffs,
 and eventually becoming concerned with
 "putting out fires" to help keep the pro-
 gram on track and to find new uses for
 its product. He emphasized the im-
 portance of organizational independence
 for the analytical staff to provide for
 maximum objectivity and minimum bias
 or advocacy pressures. He also noted
 the difficulty (especially for contractors)
 of obtaining comparable performance
 data on competing "blue" systems. 0
 Mission Analysis Study
 Guideline
 D.E. Spencer
 Hughes Aircraft Company
 The following guideline for conduct-
 ing and reporting high quality military
 mission analysis studies was distributed
 to attendees at the recent ORSA-Denver
 session on "Good Military Analysis "
 (see accompanying review of this ses-
 sion, submitted by Clay Thomas! Jim
 Bexfield.) This useful guideline is util-
 ized extensively by the various mission
 analysis staffs at the Hughes Aircraft
 Company; it was formulated, with the
 aid of several listed reference sources ,
 in 1982, by Dr. Bruce Whittemore,
 then corporate manager for mission
 analysis at Hughes.
 Mission Analysis Guideline
 A good analytical study and its
 associated report should allow the tech-
 nical reviewers to reach positive an-
 swers to most or all of the questions
 listed below. However, these questions
 should be viewed as a checklist of
 necessary, but not always sufficient con-
 ditions. The quality and utility of our
 studies depend greatly on the analytical
 creativity, personal motivation, and
 scholarship standards of the study team.
 These paramount ingredients are not
 "programmable" - and certainly not
 ensured by any sort of analysis "cook-
 book" which might be issued to study
 leaders.
 Problem Statement and Motivation
 for the Study
 • Is the problem clearly stated?
 • Is the stated problem the real prob-
 lem?
 • Is the importance of the problem to
 DoD discussed?
 • Is its significance to our company in-
 dicated?
 • Are the current and near-term de-
 ficiencies of US forces in the mission
 area(s) in question indicated and
 documented?
 Research Regarding Related Studies
 • Is there convincing evidence of a thor-
 ough review of relevant literature?
 • Is a distinction drawn between this
 study and previous ones?
 Objectives and Scope of the Study
 • Are the objectives clearly stated?
 • Do these objectives relate directly to
 the stated problem?
 • Is the scope clearly defined?
 • Are the limitations in the scope of the
 study (and, hence, in the generality of
 its implications) openly indicated?
 • Does the report recognize and discuss
 important non-quantifiable factors?
 Executive Overview (EO)
 • Is the EO largely self-contained for
 the executive reader who doesn't read
 the main report?
 • Is the EO a distillation of the impor-
 tant insights gained with emphasis on
 what was learned during the study,
 not on what was done?
 Approach/Methodology
 • Are alternative methodology options
 clearly described along with basis for
 selection of one employed?
 • Is the analytical methodology logical,
 and is it explained clearly?
 • Are the details of all analytical models
 employed either provided (e.g., in
 appendices) or cited in references
 obtainable by the reviewer?
 • What effectiveness criteria are em-
 ployed and how were they selected
 e.g., from DoD operational require-
 ments or study team analysis?
 Are there measures of effectiveness,
 rather than a single measure?
 Candidate Systems and Subsystems
 • Are "all" important alternatives in-
 cluded (e.g., improvement options
 programmed by DoD, along with
 those options proposed but not yet
 funded)?
 • Are not-invented-here (NIH) candi-
 dates included?
 • Are the NIH candidates analyzed ob-
 jectively?
 Operational Context
 • Is a thorough threat assessment (in-
 cluding projected enemy systems) pro-
 vided?
 • Is there an appropriate chronological
 match between the enemy and friendly
 weapon systems "played" in the study
 (i.e., as opposed to pitting futuristic
 Blue systems against current Red sys-
 tems)?
 • Is the scenario analyzed a realistic and
 important one?
 • Is the scenario consistent with DoD
 planners' scenario(s) of interest?
 • Are the operational concepts and tac-
 tics employed by Red and Blue com-
 batants appropriate?
 • Are the assumed terrain and weather
 characteristics representative?
 Analysis of System Performance and
 Operational Effectiveness
 • Do the analyses reflect creativity on
 the part of the study team?
 • Are all non-original parts of each
 analysis clearly indicated, and are
 their sources properly acknowledged?
 • Are the analyses rigorous and replic-
 able?
 • Are the underlying assumptions rea-
 sonable and clearly stated?
 • Are uncertain variables identified, and
 are appropriate sensitivity analyses
 then provided?
 • Are key assumptions noted on the
 graphs and tables of analytic results?
 • Are the principal messages highlighted
 on graphs and tables of analytic re-
 sults?
 • Does the text contain a clear and con-
 cise explanation of why each of the
 important analytic results occur?
 Cost Analysis
 • Is the cost-estimating methodology ex-
 plained adequately, and is it appropri-
 ate?
 • If parametric costing was employed,
 are the cost-estimating relationships
 valid?
 • Are all relevant costs included, and
 are sunk costs excluded?
 • Are the sources of cost data provided?
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